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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRETT W. NELSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 17 ,667 
JEFF JACOBSEN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE .Qf'. THE ~ 
Plaintiff brought this action at law to recover money 
damages against defendant for alienating the affections of his 
former wife. 
DISPOSITION 11:!. THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to the Court, Honorable Don v. 
Tibbs, District Judge, on January 21, 1981. Defendant was not 
represented by counsel at trial. The trial resulted in a judgment 
against defendant totalling $84,600.00. Thereafter, defendant 
retained counsel and moved for a new trial and for judgment 
n.o.v., both of which motions were denied. Defendant then filed 
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this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and Brenda Nelson (now Jacobsen) were 
married July 15, 1978. (Tr. 18). At the time in question the 
Plaintiff was 21 years of age (Tr. 21), and Brenda was age 18 
(Tr. 20). 
In October of the same year, Plaintiff and his wife 
became acquainted with the Defendant who had been previously 
married, but was now divorced, and who, at age 31, was somewhat 
older than the Plaintiff and Brenda (defendant's deposition, 
pages 3-6) • 
The first untoward contact between the Defendant and 
Plaintiff's wife occurred some few months later on New Year's 
Eve, 1978, at a party held at Defendant's residence, at which 
time Defendant claimed that Plaintiff's wife approached him and 
said she wanted to go to bed with him (defendant's deposition p. 
9) .1 
The Defendant's next contact with Plaintiff's wife was 
approximately one week later at the Defendant's house at 
approximately l o'clock in the morning. The contact lasted for 
about an hour and a half (defendant's deposition, page 10). 
1 At trial Defendant initially denied this contact, but after being 
shown his sworn testimony in the deposition, he acknowledged its accuracy. 
Because of such denials and inconsistencies with his former testimony, 
the Court ordered publication of the Defendant's deposition, and it is 
now before the Court (Tr. 71). It should further be noted that Plaintiff's 
fonner wife, Brenda, denied the incident, though at the time of trial she 
was married to Defendant, their rrarriage having been contracted on October 
1, 1980 (Tr. 76). 
- 2 -
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Defendant testified in his deposition of several 
late-night meetings at his home with plaintiff's ex-wife: 
Q. Was the next contact after that 
when you [meaning defendant and plaintiff's 
ex-wife] were alone? 
A. Probably my house again. 
Q. Night? 
A. I don't know. l..t depends on 
probably what hours Brett was working, I 
would imagine. 
(deposition p. 14 lines 20 - 25) 
Q. Most of them [meetings between 
defendant and Brendal would have been --
A. In the hour and a half bracket, 
you are right. 
Q. And around the midnight area and 
1:00 o'clock? 
A. I say fifty fifty, you know, it 
was either noon or midnight, one of the two. 
Q. Depending on when he was 
working? 
A. Yes. 
(defendant's deposition p. 15 lines 
15 - 25) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant then went on to testify that there had been 
approximately twenty of these types of visits, plus two times he 
had gone to Brenda's house, plus some rides around town in her 
truck. (defendant's deposition p. 18). 
Plaintiff first learned of the contacts between his 
wife and the Defendant during the early part of June of 1979, 
when after sustaining an injury at the coal mine, he came home 
early from work, and found his wife and the Defendant sitting on 
a porch outside of his residence. The time was between 11:30 and 
- 3 -
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I ~ 
12:30 at night. (Tr. 19 and 20). Plaintiff was not sure what was 
going on, and after being assured by his wife that there was 
nothing, he "let the matter slide" (Tr. 20). Shortly thereafter, 
Plaintiff again came home early from work and found his wife not 
home. Sometime later Plaintiff's wife arrived with the Defendant, 
who had taken her to one of the nearby mountain canyons. (Tr. 
21>. The incident resulted in a family session, involving the 
Plaintiff, his wife Brenda, and both of their parents. (Tr. 21). 
Brenda, now Mrs. Jacobsen, denied that the subject of her seeing 
Mr. Jacobsen, the Defendant, was discussed at all. (Tr. 103). 
However, even Brenda's father, who was called by the Defendant as 
a witness, testified on cross-examination that that was the 
subject of the conversation. (Tr. 118). 
These two incidents in June brought matters to a head 
and Plaintiff's father contacted Defendant and requested that he 
leave Brenda alone to see if they couldn't make their marriage 
work. (Tr. 53). Defendant acknowledged that plaintiff's father 
contacted him on two occasions requesting that he leave Brenda 
alone (defendant's depostion p. 32 line 34 and Tr. 77). Defendant 
advised plaintiff's father as follows: "I'll pick my friends, 
thank you" (defendant's deposition p. 34 lines 21-22). Regarding 
a conversation with Brenda's father (Ferrell Wynn), concerning 
the same subject, defendant testified: 
- 4 -
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tell 
her? 
Q. (by Mr. Hciff): Did you ever 
him that you would never quit seeing 
A. At one conversation I believe 
something was mentioned that if -- I can't 
remember how it went exactly, something about 
and I said, "I'll be Brenda's friend as long 
as she wants me to be her friend. I'll be 
it," and that's about the way that went down. 
(Defendant's deposition, page 29 lines 5-12). 
During the weeks that followed, defendant continued to 
see plaintiff's wife, and in August took her to Las Vegas on an 
overnight trip (defendant's deposition page 19, Tr. 23 and 77). 
The trip had been arranged in a late night/early morning phone 
call between defendant and plaintiff's wife, which was 
interrupted when plaintiff came home sometime after midnight (Tr. 
23 and 24). Defendant asserted that plaintiff had consented to 
this trip (Tr. 13). Plaintiff described his consent as follows: 
A. I actually never consented, came 
out and gave my full consent that it was O.K. 
for her to go because actually in my mind, it 
wasn't O.K. for her to go but she would have 
went whether I said yes or no. (Tr. 24 lines 
29-30 to Tr. 25 lines 1-2). 
A. I consented in the idea that it 
would, more or less, help us out because she 
said she wanted to go to Vegas so she could 
get her head on straight and trying to 
straighten herself out, so we might be able 
to get back together. (Tr. page 26 lines 
24-28). 
- 5 -
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A. I told her I wished she 
wouldn't, but if tfat is what she had to do, 
that was her will. 
Al though defendant claims to have done nothing 
improper, he did not ask plaintiff's permission nor did he give 
plaintiff notice of the trip (defendant's deposition page 20 line 
21). At first, defendant testified that plaintiff's wife got her 
own room (defendant's deposition page 20), but later acknowledged 
that he handled the registration under his own name (defendant's 
deposition page 22). With regard to what happened in the room, 
defendant testified: 
I just opened the door, walked in 
and looked around and saw that everything was 
cool for her, she went in to bed and I went 
back to gambling (defendant's deposition page 
23 lines 16-18). 
Plaintiff's ex-wife had ostensibly gone to Las Vegas to 
be alone and to consider her problems, yet it appears from 
defendant's testimony that she was gambling with him and 
apparently intended to continue doing that until her luck 
2 
Plaintiff's consent, if it may be called such, must be gauged in 
light of the fact that Defendant was his "friend" and had actually under-
taken to counsel him regarding his marital affairs (Tr. 14). In addition, 
the age difference between Plaintiff (21), and his wife ( 18), and the 
Defendant (31) nay have had the inpact of disarming Plaintiff and causing 
him to place trust where it was rot properly lodged. His limited exposure 
and experience may have made him a poor match for Defendant in a contest 
for his wife's affections. 
- 6 -
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changed and she won sufficient money to pay for the motel room 
(defendant's deposition page 25). Defendant's testimony about the 
motel was elusive. He testified that he had no receipts, no 
evidence of any kind that would indicate what the motel was, that 
he didn't known where it was, how big it was, or anything about 
it, and that he "couldn't find it in a million years" 
(defendant's deposition page 26). 
Shortly after the Vegas trip, the subject of the 
defendant's involvement arose in a conversation between plaintiff 
and his ex-wife. Plaintiff wanted "to find out exactly what kind 
of relationship they actually had together" (Tr. 27 lines 10-11). 
Concerning this conversation plaintiff testified: 
A. That's when she told me not to 
ask her anything that I didn't want to hear 
and I asked her how many times she'd been 
with him, how much involvement and activity 
she actually had with him, sexually Csicl 
involvement. I asked her about that and I 
finally got her down to ten or twelve times 
(Tr. page 27 lines 16-21). 
The foregoing disclosure triggered a confrontation 
between plaintiff and his wife, which resulted in her requesting 
that she be taken to the defendant's house. Plaintiff declined 
and so his wife went to defendant's on her own (Tr. 27). 
- 7 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Following the June discovery by plaintiff of his 
ex-wife's involvement with the defendant, his life changed 
markedly. According to plaintiff's father, his alcohol problem 
quadrupled (Tr. 58). Where he had had stable employment before 
(Tr. 54), he went through four employers in a relatively short 
period of time (Tr. 30). His income between June of 1978 and the 
trial in January of 1980 was only half of what is was before (Tr. 
31). Termination of his theretofore productive employment came in 
July following the June discovery, and was directly related 
thereto (Tr. 25 and 61). His income before had been $2,500.00 per 
month (Tr. 25). The court awarded plaintiff $600.00 per month for 
sixteen months following the alienation (Tr. 129). 
July, August and September were rocky months for the 
Nelson marriage. During this period of time, plaintiff's ex-wife 
stayed with defendant at his home on more than one occasion. 
During one such visit, her girlfriend Linda Springer (who also 
appeared as a witness), brought her some clothing (Tr. 109 and 
122). The Vegas trip took place during this period of time. 
In September, plaintiff filed an action for divorce and 
also filed the instant action, claiming that the defendant had 
alienated the affections of his wife. Around the end of October 
the parties had a fight, after which the plaintiff's ex-wife went 
to the defendant's house and thence to her parents and did not 
- 8 -
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return. Plaintiff and his ex-wife each described his or her role 
in the fight as being a defensive one. Plaintiff testified: 
A. She attacked me and I tried to 
push her away. She'd just keep coming back. I 
slapped her with the palm of my hand. 
Q. Cby Mr. Jacobsen) You slapped 
her; is that righ? 
A. Yes, I did. 
wall? 
Q. Did you push her against the 
A. I pushed her to try to keep her 
away from me, yes (Tr. 46 lines 17-24). 
Plaintiff's ex-wife described her role as follows: 
Q. Cby Mr. Mciffl Do you 
acknowledge tht you kicked Brett and you 
scratched and you bit him and fully 
participated in that? 
A. Yes, I am. I know I scratched 
him and I kicked him, but that was my only 
defense that I had against him. He's ten 
times stronger than I am and I am aware that 
I did that, but I did not bite him. I don't 
remember biting him, but I did scratch him, 
yes, I did (Tr. 110 lines 21-28). 
A decree of divorce was filed between the Nelsons on 
November 1, 1979, and became final three months thereafter. The 
decree notwithstanding, plaintiff continued to feel affection for 
his wife, and continued to explore with her the possibility of 
reconciliation before expiration of the interlocutory period and 
remarriage thereafter. That continued until approximately one 
- 9 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
week before plaintiff's ex-wife became the wife of the defendant 
(Tr. 30). Plaintiff's ex-wife acknowledged this overture from 
plaintiff approximately a week before her marriage to the 
defendant (Tr. 112). 
The alienation of affection matter came before the 
court in January, March, May and July of 1980 (Tr. 144). The 
proceedings had gone through the point of pretrial, during all of 
which time defendant was represented by counsel. 
During the summer of 1980 plaintiff and defendant 
reached a settlement agreement in the instant matter, and the 
settlement documents, including a motion and order of dismissal 
and a promissory note, were forwarded to defendant's counsel. The 
stipulated order of dismissal was executed August 9, 1980 and 
filed August 12, 1980. However, defendant's counsel failed to 
obtain execution of the promissory note by his client, thereby 
nullifying the settlement. CR. 15) • 
After having succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of the 
alienation of affection suit, and before any effort to reinstate 
the action had been made, defendant, on October 1, 1980, in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, married plaintiff's ex-wife, Brenda Nelson (Tr. 
76) • 
On December 26, 1980, and in order to revive the case. 
plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate the action and set it for 
- 10 -
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trial. CR. 14). The motion was noticed for January 7, 1981, and 
copies of all proceedings were mailed to defendant. CR. 19). 
The motions were called up for hearing by the Court on 
January 7, 1981. Defendant was present in the courtroom when the 
Court ordered the reinstatement and set the matter for trial on 
January 21, 1981. CR. 20 and 64). 
The Court's order of reinstatement and order setting 
the matter for trial were reduced to writing on January 14, 1981 
and copies thereof were mailed to defendant on January 15, 1981. 
CR. 14 and 15). In addition, the Court's executive clerk sent 
notice of the trial date to defendant, and called him personally 
on the telephone advising him that the trial was going forward, 
that he should retain an attorney, and that plaintiff was 
represented by an attorney. CR. 64). Defendant replied that he 
intended to represent himself. CR. 64). 
Defendant appeared at the time and place set for trial. 
After an inquiry by the Court, he indicated his readiness and 
willingness to proceed I1.IQ se. (Tr. 6 and 7). 
The trial proceeded. Defendant cross-examined 
plaintiff's witnesses, called and examined his own witnesses, 
testified personally, and argued his case. The Court found the 
evidence against him and entered judgment. 
- 11 -
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Defendant retained new counsel and moved the Court for 
a new trial and for judment n.o.v., both of which motions were 
denied. Defendant filed objections to the Court's order denying 
the motions. All of defendant's objections were disallowed except 
one, and the Court modified its order accordingly. Defendant then 
filed this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: AN ACTION AT LAW FOR ALIENATION OF 
AFFECTIONS IS VIABLE UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF 
THIS STATE AND SHOULD NOT BE ABOLISHED. 
Defendant's assertion that the State of Utah no longer 
recognizes the tort of alienation of affections is simply without 
foundation in legal precedent. To the contrary, Utah clearly 
appears to be one state which continues to recognize this tort. 
The Utah Court has recognized the right to recover for 
alienation of affection, Wils9n y_._ Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 
P2d 759 CUtah 1954) and for criminal conversation, Cahoon ~ 
Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P2d 94 (Utah 1959). 
A useful discussion of the topic appears in an article 
in the Utah Bar Journal, in which the author states: 
Considering the emphasis that has been placed 
- 12 -
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Law 
on marriage in Utah by political and 
religious leaders, there have been 
surprisingly few actions brought to seek 
redres~ for loss of consortium occasioned by 
an interference with the marital 
relationship. 
But our society encourages marriage and 
regulates it -- should it not also come to 
the aid of the marriage partners when the 
relationship is soured by the interference of 
a third party? "Tortious Interference with 
Marital Relations in Utah", 5 filiill Bar 
Journal 75 {Fall/Winter 1977 Edition). 
Defendant's brief quotes at length from a North Dakota 
Review article which is replete with assumptions, 
conclusions, and reasoning which the undersigned considers to be 
fundamentally in error and grossly deficient in respect of the 
importance of the marriage contract, the rights of the respective 
parties therein, and the entitlement of marital parties to be 
free from intentional interference by third persons. 
Obviously the authorities are split. Appellant has 
quoted accurately from many jurisdictions which support his 
position. In the final analysis the issue may rest on the 
deference due established Utah precedent and the marital 
philosophy ingrained in our society. As perceived by the 
undersigned, that philosophy is as follows: 
Reason and experience demonstrate that a 
- 13 -
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marriage involving a husband and wife as 
partr:ers secures to each not only material 
services, but love, felicity, companionship, 
the exchange of ideas, consultation with 
respect to the family welfare and the rearing 
of children, and the maintenance of an 
intimacy abounding in reciprocal acts of 
kindness. Alberty_._ McGrath, 278 F.2d 16, 18, 
(D.C. Cir. 1960). 
Our society could not insure that all marriages enjoy 
perfect harmony, for that is rarely, if ever possible, and is not 
the business of the state to enforce. The marriage, however, 
should be protected from interference by third parties, so that 
the marriage partners have the opportunity to work toward a state 
of harmony that will secure to each the substantial benefits 
thereof. The action need not be based on the anachronism that the 
wife is the husband's chattel but rather on the fact that the 
marriage secures to each certain substantial benefits worthy of 
protection from intentional interference from third persons. The 
benefits to be derived from marriage as well as the damage which 
can be inflicted by an interloper have not appreciably changed 
since Wilson y_._ Oldroyd, .§.1!.l2lil., and the interest of the law in 
protecting the marriage remains as valid as ever. 
Recovery is allowed even though the offending spouse 
willingly participates in the defendant's proscribed conduct, and 
even if there has been enticement of defendant by the off ending 
spouse. Wilson y_._ Oldroyd, ~' 267 P2d at 763. In this case. 
- 14 -
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the evidence shows that Brenda Nelson (the offending spouse) 
willingly participated with defendant. Even if she had enticed 
him, recovery would still be proper. 
Punitive damages can be awarded only where there is a 
finding of malice. Evidence that defendant continued to pursue 
plaintiff's wife after being warned to desist supports a finding 
of wilful! and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights so as to 
justify an award of punitive damages. Wilson y_._ Oldroyd, fil!.mr 
267 P2d at 764. 
POINT II: THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The applicable rule of judicial review in this kind of 
case was set forth by Justice Crockett in the frequently cited 
case of Charlton vs. Hackett, 11 U2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961), in 
which the court stated: 
In considering the attack on the findings and 
judgment of the trial court it is our .duty to 
follow these cardinal rules or review: to 
indulge them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; to require the appellant _to 
sustain a burden of showing error; to review 
the record in the light most favorable to 
them· and not to disturb them if they find 
substantial support in the evidence. 
- 15 -
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As one might expect, the testimony in the trial was 
full of contradictions. The defendant and his new wife sought to 
fix the blame for marital difficulties on the plaintiff, and 
described their pre-existing relationship as being "platonic". In 
fact, "platonic" became the most over-used word in the trial, as 
defendant, his new wife, and her girlfriend all described the 
developing relationship between defendant and plaintiff's ex-wife 
by use of this term. The court could well have concluded that the 
defendant had "coached" the testimony. 
An effort was made to blame the problem on plaintiff's 
use of alcohol, but plaintiff's ex-wife acknowledged that she 
also used alcohol, and the evidence revealed that plaintiff's use 
was four times worse following the June discovery of the problem 
between his wife and the defendant. The serious confrontations 
and problems of which all testified, for the most part arose 
following the June discovery. With respect to the impact this had 
on the plaintiff, his ex-wife's father testified as follows: 
Q. Cby Mr. 
with her leaving and 
employment and all 
after you were ma:~~ 
involvement? 
Mciff) All the problems 
coming and going and his 
those things happened 
aware of Mr. Jacobsen's 
A. Yes (Tr. 119 lines 8-12). 
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Perhaps the most that can be said in response to 
appellant's questioning the sufficiency of the evidence is that 
the trial judge was there and listened to all the witnesses. He 
observed the defendant and his new wife attempt to characterize 
their relationship, the midnight meetings and the Vegas trip as 
being "platonic". He listened to the plaintiff, his parents, his 
ex-wife's father, and Brenda's girlfriend, and concluded that the 
relationship was much more than defendant acknowledged and that 
it was intentional and resulted in the alienation of the 
affections of plaintiff's wife. In his deposition, defendant had 
indicated that any kisses between him and plaintiff's wife would 
not have been "passionate" (defendant's deposition page 19). The 
judge concluded otherwise, and did so with the advantage of 
having all of the parties before him. 
Appellant has suggested the adoption of what he refers 
to as the Kansas standard (see Long ~ Fischer, 210 Kansas 21, 
499 P2d 1063 (1972)). That case imposes an impossible burden, 
since the only two persons who could really establish the 
required ingredients would be the interloper and the estranged 
spouse (in this case, the defendant and his new wife). 
under the Kansas standard, the more successful the 
alienation, the more impossible the burden on the party who has 
lost his spouse. If the interloper has been successful to the 
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point of total alienation and marriage of plaintiff's wife, he 
will have successfully defeated any opportunity to show that the 
estranged wife was not a willing participant, as the Kansas 
standard would require. This standard would constitute almost a 
total departure from that set forth by this court in Wilson y_,_ 
0 l d ro yd , .fil!fil:..S. 
The findings and judgment of the trial court find 
substantial support in the record when such is viewed in the 
light most favorable to those findings and judgment. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT HEARD THE EVIDENCE 
AND ENTERED JUDGMENT THEREON; UNLESS THE 
AWARD WAS BASED ON PASSION OR PREJUDICE. THE 
MATTER SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED, REVERSED OR 
MODIFIED ON APPEAL. 
It is interesting to note that the lower court awards 
of compensatory and punitive damages in Wilson y_,_ Oldroyd, ~, 
although set by a jury, were identical to the awards made by the 
trial judge in this case. In the Wilson case the Court said: 
If the [award] • • is so grossly excessive 
that it must have been inspired by passion or 
prejudice, or by spite, envy, ill will or 
corruption, as contrasted with reason and 
justice, the [award) cannot be permitted to 
stand. 267 P2d at 764. 
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The only statement by the trial court which 
approximates passion is at Tr. 124 lines 2 to 17, where Judge 
Tibbs, in announcing his judgment, said: 
The Court finds that marriage and family --
that marriage is a sacred institution and 
that anyone who interferes with that should 
suffer the full consequences of the law and 
I'm just telling you, Mr. Jacobsen, at this 
time that this Court nearly every week is 
having criminal trials where people steal 
money from other people and in my opinion 
you've stolen something far more than money, 
you have interfered with the whole basis 
fabric of society and, when you tell me it's 
a plutonic relationship, I say it's nonsense. 
I don't buy it at all and I don't want you to 
think I do. I don't know how they're going to 
collect any money judgments that I give 
against you but they' re certainly going to 
get one against you and I hope this gets well 
publicized because I'd like everyone to know 
that if a case like this comes into my Court, 
that they can expect to suffer; •••• 
The unambigous import of Judge Tibbs' comments do show 
a passionate regard for the importance of marriage and family 
life in our society. There is no indication of prejudice, spite, 
envy, ill will or corruption toward this defendant, except that 
he was the cause of the ruin of a marriage. 
In regard to the dollar amount of the award, our Court 
has said: 
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The jury [in this case, the judge] is allowed 
great latitude in assessing damages for 
personal injuries. The present cost of 
living and the dimished purchasing power of 
the dollar may be taken into consideration 
when estimating damages. 
• • • (T)he mere fact that it [the verdict] 
was more than another jury, or more than this 
court, might have given, or even more than 
the evidence justified, does not conclusively 
show that it was the result of passion, 
prejudice or corruption. Pauly y_,_ McCarthy, 
109 Utah 431, 184 P2d 123, 127 Cl947). 
The Wilson court allowed the award for compensatory 
damages to stand, but reduced the punitive damages award from 
$25,000.00 to $5,000.00. In light of Chief Justice Wolfe's 
comments in Pauly y_,_ McCarthy, supra, regarding the dimished 
purchasing power of the dollar, it seems particularly appropriate 
that the damage awards in this case be affirmed. 
POINT IV: THE RECORD SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT 
VOLUNTARILY AND ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED 
HIMSELF AT TRIAL; THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ALLOW A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that a new trial should be granted for 
two reasons. He claims first that he was not afforded timely 
notice and a i:easonable opportunity to be heard, and, second, 
that the pretrial procedure was fundamentally unfair. 
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Defendant's position is premised on the faulty 
allegation that he first learned on January 19, 1981 of the trial 
scheduled for January 21, 1981, and that he had no opportunity to 
obtain other counsel. 
The facts are that Defendant knew from mid-summer, 1980 
that he had reneged on the settlement agreement reached, and that 
the lawsuit had been dismissed in reliance on that agreement. In 
the face of that, defendant did nothing, seeking thereby to take 
advantage of a dismissal premised on what amounted to a fraud. 
Thereafter, the first order of business was to get the 
case reinstated and set down for trial. Plaintiff's right to 
acheive that result is not open to question. The reinstatement 
occurred on January 7, 1981, two weeks prior to trial and in the 
presence of and with the full knowledge of defendant. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff should have sent 
notice to defendant to obtain counsel or proceed without counsel 
pursuant to the requirements of Sec. 78-51-36, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which provides that such notice is required when 
"an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as 
such." 
Defendant's attorney did not die, nor was he removed or 
suspended, leaving only the question as to the meaning of the 
phrase "ceases to act as such." 
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The phrase in question was defined in the early Utah 
case Van Cott et al. y_._ wall, 53 Utah 282, 17 8 Pac. 4 2 CUtah 
1918), in which the Court, quoting a Michigan case, held as 
follows: 
We do not understand this to apply to a case 
where a practicing attorney for any reason 
declines to go on with a particular case 
while still continuing in practice. It might 
be made the means of serious mischief if it 
could have such a construction. The plain 
meaning of the statute is to provide for 
cases in which the attorney or solicitor, by 
reason of death, disability, or other cause, 
has ceased to practice in the court. His 
refusal to proceed in a particular case is 
not ceasing to "act as such~ attorney or 
solicitor; it does not even disconnect him 
with the case; for that can only be 
accomplished by consent of the parties or of 
the court, or by regular proceedings for 
substitution of another. (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court reached an identical result in the 
case Security Adjustment Bureau, 1n£... y_._ West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 
437 P2d 214 (Utah 1968) , in which the Court said: 
West urges that the court erred in not 
setting aside the default judgment because 
Security did not demand that West get new 
counsel when his attorney withdrew. This, 
under Sec. 78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. This urgence is not well taken since 
there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that West withdrawing counsel died, was 
removed or suspended from the practice of 
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law. The case of Van Cott v. Wall seems to be 
controlling here. 
Defendant has cited the more recent decision of Utah 
Oil Company y_._ Hanis, 565 P2d 1135 (Utah 1977) in which the 
Court, after citing the statute in question, said: 
The foregoing clearly appears to have been 
enacted to safeguard a litigant who finds 
himself without counsel and prevents further 
proceedings until he again has counsel or 
chooses to proceed I2LQ .§g. (Emphasis added.) 
While the earlier decisions remain good law, the later 
decision suggests that the Court may look beyond the strict 
language to safeguard a litigant who did not have a reasonable 
opportunity to obtain other counsel and had not chosen to 
represent himself. 
The statute as construed in the earlier two cases is 
clearly inapplicable to the case at bar. Taking the broader 
approach suggested by Utah Oil y_._ Harris, ~, there is still 
no procedural problem since the evidence supports the conclusion 
that defendant had made the choice to represent himself. 
Defendant furhter argues that plaintiff's failure to 
notify defendant to obtain counsel or proceed without counsel 
violated Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the District and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. This Rule contains two 
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paragraphs, one of which is identical to Sec. 78-51-36, U.C.A., 
1953 as amended, and the other of which provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
When an attorney withdraws as counsel of 
record, written notice of the withdrawal must 
be served upon the client of the withdrawing 
attorney and upon all other parties not in 
default and a certificate of service must be 
forthwith filed with the court. 
Unlike the statute, the rules do not impose a 
jurisdictional requirement. Rule 14 .4 Cc) of the same Rules of 
Practice provides: 
(c) Strict compliance with the foregoing 
rules may be waived by the court, in its 
discretion, in order to prevent manifest 
injustice. 
The following quote is illustrative of the purpose of 
rules of practice: 
(T)here is abundant authority in 
support of the view that rules of court are 
but a means to accomplish the ends of 
justice, and that the court has the power to 
modify, suspend, or rescind its own rules 
whenever justice requires it • • • • 21 
C.J.S. Courts Section 178. 
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Such a waiver was obviously made by the trial Court in 
this instance, and is supported by the evidence. Defendant was 
aware that he had reneged on a settlement agreement, which 
agreement resulted in dismissal of the lawsuit (summer, 1980). 
Defendant was notified of plaintiff's intention to reinstate the 
matter and have it set for trial (Motion to Reinstate and for 
Trial Setting, dated December 26, 1980, set for hearing January 
7, 1981). Sometime between the time that defendant's counsel 
withdrew (September 9, 1980) and January 7, 1981, defendant 
consulted with other counsel, who was not retained. From the time 
the action was reinstated and set down for trial, defendant had 
adequate opportunity to contact and retain other counsel, but 
elected not to do so. Defendant was present personally on January 
7, 1981 when the matter was reinstated and set for trial. 
The court expressly found that an additional notice 
from plaintiff to defendant to obtain counsel or proceed J2I.Q se 
would have served no useful purpose and that defendant had made 
the decision to represent himself CR. 80). 
expressly found that the defendant was 
The court further 
aware that his 
relationship with his former attorney had terminated, that the 
matter was going forward and that he was either obliged to obtain 
counsel or represent himself. The court found that he did the 
latter CR. 80). The court expressly found that it would be unjust 
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to impose on plaintiff the necessity of a new trial when at the 
time of trial there was nothing before the court which would have 
indicated that the trial should not go forward (R. 80). 
In retrospect, defendant may assert that he was not 
prepared to proceed, but at the time and place fixed for trial, 
he announced that he was representing himself and that he was 
ready to proceed. He cross-examined plaintiff's witnesses, called 
and examined his own witnesses, testified himself and argued his 
case. He never at any time said or did anything that the trial 
court could have taken to mean anything other than a conscious 
decison to proceed Ill.Q se, and this was so notwithstanding 
cautions and recommendations from the Court Clerk and the Court 
itself. 
Defendant's argument states that plaintiff's failure to 
provide notice to defendant to obtain counsel or proceed without 
counsel effectively cut off the trial Court's jurisdiction to 
proceed with any part of the case after the date that defendant's 
original counsel withdrew. The Rules of Practice of the District 
and Circuit Courts were adopted pursuant to the authority granted 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (U.R.C.P. 83), and, the 
Rules of Practice must by consistent with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. U.R.C.P. 82 provides: 
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These Rules shall not be construed to extend 
or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of 
this state or the venue of actions therein. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff is in agreement with the basic discussion in 
defendant's brief regarding due process and procedural fairness. 
Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that no response thereto is 
required for the reason that the facts of the case do not give 
rise to the application of the concepts discussed. Reduced to 
bare bones, defendant, with adequate notice and caution, chose to 
represent himself. There were no surprises sprung, no defaults 
entered, no declining to afford additional time to prepare or to 
obtain counsel, no ungranted requests or petitions, and no abuse 
of discretion. The only thing which defendant requested and did 
not receive was a non-suit on plaintiff's complaint. This was not 
a procedural, but a substantive matter, based on the trial 
court's view of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should, in all 
respects, be affirmed. ~ 
Respectfully submitted this [~ day of October, 1981. 
K~ 
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CERTIFICATE Q.E SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) full, true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were placed 
in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on 
the /2._Tlf day of October, 1981, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Craig M. Snyder 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84601 
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